William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 10 (2018-2019)
Issue 1

Article 7

November 2018

Digital Gold: Cybersecurity Regulations and Establishing the Free
Trade of Big Data
Victoria Conrad

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Part of the Science and Technology Law Commons

Repository Citation
Victoria Conrad, Digital Gold: Cybersecurity Regulations and Establishing the Free Trade of Big
Data, 10 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 295 (2018), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol10/
iss1/7
Copyright c 2018 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr

DIGITAL GOLD: CYBERSECURITY REGULATIONS
AND ESTABLISHING THE FREE TRADE OF
BIG DATA
VICTORIA CONRAD
ABSTRACT
Data is everywhere. With more than ten billion Internetenabled devices worldwide, each day individuals create a flood of
information that is transferred onto the Internet as big data. Businesses that have the resources to capture and utilize data can better
understand their consumers, allowing for reinforcement of customer relationship management, improvements to the management
of operational risk, and enhancement of overall firm performance.
However, big data’s advantages come with high costs. The cost of
organization and storage coupled with the fact that no legal principle
allows for any sort of property rights in big data creates a “digital divide” between data giants, like Facebook and Google, and
smaller businesses. What’s more, because each country sets different
cybersecurity standards, start-up costs and expenses are cutting
many businesses out of the digital market. This Note will first discuss the basics of big data and then argue that policymakers need
to promote the free trade of data as a commodity with independent property rights. This Note will then discuss the obstacles to th e
free trade of data regarding privacy rights and the diversity of
international cybersecurity regulations. Finally, this Note will propose the need for a multilateral convention on cybersecurity that
will promote a centralized regulatory approach.
JD Candidate William & Mary Law School, Class of 2019; BS Political
Science, University of Maryland, College Park, Class of 2016. The author would
like to thank the editorial board and staff of the William & Mary Business Law
Review for their help throughout the editing process. She also would like to express gratitude to her parents, Chris and Joanne Conrad, for their continuing
support throughout her entire education.
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I NTRODUCTION
The world runs on oil, or at least it did.1 The United States’
development into the great industrial power of the twentieth
century was built on the exploitation of oil.2 However, “‘black gold’
is no longer the world’s most valuable resource—it has been surpassed by data.”3 The five most valuable companies in the world,
“Technologic Giants”—Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, and
Alphabet (Google)—have commodified data to take over their sectors.4 Yet, these Giants are not the only companies benefitting
from data usage.5 Across industries, “companies are ramping up
their attention” to big data.6 “[B]illions of connected devices—
smartphones, cars, tablets, household and industrial products, and
business process machines—that together have the potential to
transform how companies deliver innovation, create differentiated
customer experiences, and optimize global operations.”7
But as this new frontier opens for businesses, data’s containment, regulation, and protection are falling behind.8 “With
more than [ten] billion [I]nternet-enabled devices worldwide …
[the] increasing surface area leaves us vulnerable to attack.”9 Big
data may be the next “gold rush,” but it involves many costs,
benefits, and externalities that have yet to be addressed.10
MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE ROAD TO GLOBAL PROSPERITY 18 (Simon &
Schuster, 1st ed. 2014).
2 Petroleum Resources, SUNY SUFFOLK, http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/westn/oil
.html [https://perma.cc/7JGX-RELG].
3 Ramona Pringle, ‘Data is the New Oil’: Your Personal Information is Now t he
World’s Most Valuable Commodity, CBC N EWS (Aug. 25, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://
www.cbc.ca/news/technology/data-is-the-new-oil-1.4259677
[https://perma.cc
/QEZ2-ZY49].
4 Id.
5 See id.
6 Paul Brody & Veena Pureswaran, The Next Digital Gold Rush: How the
Internet of Things Will Create Liquid Transparent Markets, 43 STRATEGY &
LEADERSHIP 36, 36 (2015).
7 Id.
8 Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 583 (2014).
9 Kate Edgar, Data is the New Global Commodity, MEDIUM (July 29, 2016),
https://medium.com/global-intersection/data-is-the-new-global-commodity-38
b8d7e43ebf [https://perma.cc/6P6J-ZEU3].
10 Brody & Pureswaran, supra note 6.
1
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Part I of this Note will give a background on big data, the
benefits it offers, as well as the barriers that prevent new companies from accessing large-scale data use. Because big data has
created such an opportunity for economic advancements, Part II
of this Note will argue that policymakers need to promote the free
trade of data as a commodity with independent property rights.
Part III will discuss the obstacles the free trade of data faces
regarding privacy rights and international cybersecurity regulations. Finally, Part IV will propose the need for a multilateral
convention to promote the international data exchange and create a more centralized system of cybersecurity.
I. B ACKGROUND
“Big data is just what it sounds like ... massive amounts
of information generated and gathered by modern technology.” 11
Big data contains traditional scientific information, such as DNA
evidence, genome mapping, chemical screening, climate data , and
population analysis.12 However, new analytical technology has
transformed data collection, enabling researchers to gather lesstraditional information.13 Each day, individuals “generate an avalanche of [data] each day, in tweets and posts, in web browser
histories and credit card purchases, in GPS-marked cellphone calls,
in fitness trackers, and ATM transactions.”14 For the first time,
scientists have the resources to capture and analyze a person’s
digital existence.15
Big data has become synonymous with business intelligenc e,
analytics, and data mining.16 With 2.5 quintillion bytes of data
11 Alvin Powell, Big Data, Massive Potential, HARV. GAZETTE (Oct. 13, 2015),
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2015/10/big-data-massive-potential/
[https://perma.cc/QJ6Q-BVJ6].
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 James Manyika et al., Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition and Productivity, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST. 1 (2011), https://bigdatawg
.nist.gov/pdf/MGI_big_data_full_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FWU-Z5DB].
16 M. Moorthy et al., An Analysis for Big Data and its Technologies, 4 INT’ L
J. OF COMPUT. SCI. ENG ’G & TECH. 412, 412 (2014).
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created every day,17 “[b]ig data presents concepts, methods, technologies, IT architectures and tools available to the exponentiall y
increasing volumes of diverse information ... improv[ing] the inventiveness and competitiveness of enterprises.”18 Businesses able
to harness big data have virtually shifted intelligence strategies
“from reporting and decision support to prediction and next-move
decision making.”19 The adoption of big data analytical tools and
infrastructure includes the use of transaction history, social me dia,
mobile devices, and automatic identification technologies to process and create a better understanding of the industry and its
consumers.20 Firms that can incorporate these strategies are able
to better reinforce customer relationship management, improve
the management of operational risk, and enhance operational
efficiency and overall firm performance.21 McKinsey Global Institute estimates that a retailer embracing big data can potentially
increase its operating margin by more than sixty percent.22 Furthermore, McKinsey estimates the potential annual consumer
surplus from using services enabled by personal-location data can
allow consumers to capture $600 billion in economic surplus.23
Data is now everywhere—in every sector, in every economy,
in every organization and user of data—the public sector included.24
Many believe that the use of big data in healthcare allows for personalization and the collection of real-time lifestyle data that tracks
specific activities within specific areas.25 For example, Google
Ralph Jacobson, 2.5 Quintillion Bytes of Data Created Every Day. How Do es
CPG & Retail Manage It?, IBM (Apr. 24, 2013), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/in
sights-on-business/consumer-products/2-5-quintillion-bytes-of-data-created-every
-day-how-does-cpg-retail-m anage-it/ [https://perma.cc/45X8-83Q4].
18 Moorthy et al., supra note 16.
19 Id.
20 Samuel Fosso Wamba et al., Big Data Analytics and Firm Performance:
Effects of Dynamic Capabilities, 70 J. BUS. RES. 356, 356 (2017).
21 Id. (citing Kiron D., Organization Alignment is the Key to Big Data Success, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 54 (2013)).
22 Manyika et al., supra note 15, at 2.
23 Id. at vii.
24 Id. at 2.
25 David B. Nash, Harnessing the Power of Big Data in Healthcare, 7 AM.
HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 69, 70 (2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc
/articles/PMC4049118/ pdf/ahdb-07-069.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z97P-AZMA].
17
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employs an automated method for analyzing influenza-related web
searches to track epidemics, which currently aids the work of the
Center for Disease Control.26 McKinsey estimates that, if U.S.
health care could use big data to drive efficiency and quality, the
potential value from the use of big data could be more than $300
billion every year.27
Although the private and public sectors have recognized
the value big data can bring to the global economy, full-scale integration still presents obstacles.28 The relative term “big data”
describes “a situation where the high volume, velocity, and variety of data exceed[s] an organization’s [preexisting] storage or
comput[ing] capacity for accurate and timely decision making.” 29
Researchers appropriately explain that the Internet is “like a da tadriven Niagara Falls, surging with an endless, churning, unstoppable flood of bits and bytes,” and it only keeps getting larger and
faster.30 CISCO forecasted that “global Internet traffic in 2021
will be equivalent to 127 times the volume of the entire global
Internet in 2005.”31
Data traffic is also not created in a uniform manner.32 Each
data source a business receives data from collects the information
into a different form or type, all of which must be filtered through
one infrastructure to be of any value.33 “Trying to pinpoint and
analyze a particular piece of information from the Web is like trying to pick out a specific drop of water as it rushes over the falls.”34
Elliot Naidus & Leo Anthony Celi, Big Data in Healthcare: Are We Close
to It?, 28 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE TERAPIA INTENSIVA 8, 9 (2016), https://www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4828085/pdf/rbti-28-01-0008.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/2HPE-MYNB].
27 Manyika et al., supra note 15, at 2.
28 Moorthy et al., supra note 16.
29 Id.
30 David Hunt, Big Data Challenges: Volume, Variety, Velocity & Veracity,
N.C. ST. U. RESULTS, 1, 2 (2014), https://research.ncsu.edu/results/2014/12/big
-data-challenges-volume-variety-velocity-veracity/ [https://perma.cc/62H2-CXBG].
31 CISCO Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Methodology 2016–2021,
CISCO (2017), https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider
/visual-networking-index-vni/complete-white-paper-c11-481360.html
[https://
perma.cc/R7GC-UCQA].
32 See Hunt, supra note 30.
33 Id. at 3.
34 Id. at 2.
26
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The technology requirements to gather, organize, and store
vast amounts of data is just not available for businesses wishing
to utilize big data.35 “The reality is that traditional database approaches do not scale or write data fast enough to keep up with
the speed of creation.”36 Additionally, data warehouses are effective at organizing data, but a high cost exists for the hardware
to scale out as the volume grows.37 It seems, in the case of big
data, quantity does have its own quality.38
In the private sector, the abundance of data created a “digital
divide” between the Technologic Giants and smaller companies.39
The Giants maintain colossal infrastructures able to collect and
organize data in massive quantities.40 The information collected
then allows the companies access to better information to impr ove
their products, which then attracts more users and generates even
more data.41 The data divide has a monopolistic effect on each
company’s market.42 For example, “Amazon now captures 46 [percent] of online shopping” in America,43 while Google and Facebook
“accounted for about 99 [percent] of the $2.9 billion” growth in
digital advertising in 2016.44
Furthermore, the Technologic Giants’ monopoly on data literally protects themselves.45 Within the tech industry, competition
John Bantleman, The Big Cost of Big Data, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2012, 1:21
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/04/16/the-big-cost-of-big-data
/#2728e8195a3b [https://perma.cc/JAY7-ZT7M].
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, ECONOMIST
(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy
-demands-new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-resource [https://
perma.cc/HB4P-AXFG].
39 Hwa-Jong Kim et al., The Open Data Interface (ODI) Framework for P ubl ic
Utilization of Big Data, in DATA ANALYTICS 2012 94 (Sandjai Bhulai et al. eds.,
2012) [https://perma.cc/Q8TC-UFLX].
40 The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, supra note 38.
41 Kim et al., supra note 39; The world’s most valuable resource is no longer
oil, but data, supra note 38.
42 Kim et al., supra note 39.
43 Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 712 (2017).
44 Matthew Ingram, How Google and Facebook Have Taken Over the Digit a l
Ad Industry, FORTUNE (Jan. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/04/google-face
book-ad-industry/ [https://perma.cc/73ZW-LESM].
45 The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, supra note 38.
35
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arises when incumbents are blindsided by an innovative startup
or a technological shift.46 However, the monopoly on data within
the market allows for surveillance systems to span the entire
economy.47 The Giants can see when a new competitor enters the
market, allowing them to copy it or acquire it through a “shootout acquisition” before the competitor becomes a threat.48 By creating early warning systems and further enhancing the digital divide,
the Technologic Giants can stifle competition.49
Firms wanting to access big data also face obstacles from
the decentralized nature of cybersecurity laws.50 “[D]ivergent regulatory approaches ... result in uneven levels of protection between jurisdictions.”51 Cross-border flows of data are then subjected
to more legal control to prevent laws of more protective regimes
from being circumvented and the privacy rights of companies
eroded.52 The World Trade Organization (WTO) acknowledges
the important aspects of data defense and privacy protection.53
Article XIV of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) permits trade restrictions that are necessary for “the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing
and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts.”54
If regulations on data go too far, these restrictions can hinder
competition and innovation in the digital market.55 Diversity in
regulation requires firms to adjust their infrastructure to meet
each nation’s policies.56 But without any harmonization of laws
and regimes, the friction between international data exchanges
can severely limit a business’s ability to enter certain markets.57
Id.
Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Data Protection Regulations
and International Data Flows: Implications for Trade and Development, 2 UNCTD
/WEB/DTL/STICT/2016/1/iPub (2016).
51 Id.
52 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 50.
53 General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV(c)(ii), Apr. 15, 1994, 186 9
U.N.T.S. 183 (1994).
54 Id.
55 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 50, at 3.
56 See id. at 50.
57 Id. at 3.
46
47
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II. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE FREE TRADE OF DATA
To maximize the economic and social benefits big data offers, policymakers must recognize organized data as a good and
apply free trade policies to the digital exchange.58 However, within
the United States, underdeveloped intellectual property rights and
privacy issues have caused policymakers at both the federal and
state levels to hesitate in classifying big data as a commodity.59
A. Current U.S. Federal and State Law Cannot Establish
Property Rights
Data is a raw material of production.60 “Big data is some
of the most granulated data ever available, generated from moment to moment from every device ... connected to the [I]nternet.” 61
The challenge for businesses is not gathering the data, but organizing the data and using it to target consumers in a personalized way.62 Businesses need analytical software to convert the
large and intricate data sets into utilizable information.63 Businesses use analytic software to build models based on available
data and then run situations, repeating the value of data points
and monitoring how different situations impact results.64 “Current computing power can run millions of these simulations,
thereby iterating all the possible variables until it finds a pattern, correlation, or insight” on proper business strategy.65
Even though a business’s complex analytical infrastructure
creates value out of raw data, the federal intellectual property
The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, supra note 38.
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1125, 1170 (2000).
60 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 N W. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 240, 240 (2013).
61 Shelly Blake-Plock, Where’s The Value In Big Data?, F ORBES (Apr. 14,
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/04/14/wheres
-the-value-in-big-data/#19b054ec30da [https://perma.cc/A74V-DXRQ].
62 Id.
63 See Kim et al., supra note 39, at 96.
64 Fred Greguras, Legal Issues in Big Data: 2017, ROYSE L AW F IRM (July 3,
2017, 8:06 PM), http://rroyselaw.com/technology-transactions/agtech/legal-issues
-big-data-2017/ [https://perma.cc/MJ5H-UFAK].
65 Id.
58
59
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system is not well-equipped to deal with ownership of big data or
the subsequent infrastructures created.66 Data and infrastructures
are not creative expressions that qualify for copyright (i.e., books,
paintings, sculptures).67 Not only is current copyright law inefficient
for big data ownership, but also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) codified an express limitation on copyright protection of ideas and facts.68 Since
big data is fundamentally factual information and data infrastructures usually involve combining algorithms that are classified
as ideas, this limitation bars copyrighting big data.69
When considering federal patent law, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International effectively eliminated the patentability of analytical software.70 The Court in
Alice held that, to be patent eligible, computer innovations must
incorporate “an inventive concept” beyond computer application
of an abstract idea.71 Since businesses frequently rely on computer
execution of series of routine algorithms to process big data, the
use of a computer in a “particular technological environment” wa s
not enough to transform an algorithm into an innovative concept.72
Moreover, patentability of data and the technological infrastructures would be difficult to formally define to the Patent and
Trademark Office, since both are subject to constant change and
innovation.73 When a company gathers new data, the infrastructure creates new results and the product itself changes, making
the patent invalid.74
Turning to state law, scholars have argued that trade secrecy
law may allow companies to maintain property rights in big data . 75
BRADEN R. ALLENBY ET AL., INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 6
(2001) (ebook).
67 Id.
68 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
69 Mattioli, supra note 8, at 553–54.
70 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
71 Id. (quoting that courts “must distinguish between patents that claim
the building blocks of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building
blocks into something more, ... thereby transforming them into a patenteligible invention”).
72 134 S. Ct at 2358; see 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
73 Mattioli, supra note 8, at 554.
74 Id. at 554–55, 561.
75 Id. at 551–53.
66
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“The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which most states have
adopted, defines trade secrets as [‘]information[’] that is (i) valuable, and (ii) reasonably protected.”76 “Vendors of informationbased products have long secured exclusivity in their processes
and knowhow through the law of trade secrets.”77 “The definition
of [‘]information[’] under the UTSA is expansive, covering technic al
and non-technical information, including methods, knowhow, and
even ideas.”78 For example, Google’s well-known “PageRank” algorithm and the algorithms high-speed electronic trading firms are
two examples of data analytics software that have been recognized
trade secrets.79
However, the secrecy requirement is difficult to meet for data
and infrastructures that are shared and marketed, which is a lar ge
part of the digital trade.80 Google and Facebook, in particular, have
used personal data as a new source of economic value.81 Once
processed and classified, they provide relevant information for
companies about consumer’s interests and activities, which allows
those companies to retarget these individuals for advertisement
purposes.82 Retargeted advertising is Google and Facebook’s core
business.83 Both companies constantly track information about
their users only to then disclose this data to companies willing
to pay a per-advertisement rate.84
If the goal is to expand the free trade of big data domestically and internationally, creating property rights based on trade
Id. at 550.
Id.
78 Id. (citing Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property
Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 69, 76 (1999) (“Trade secret law ... extends to technical and non -technical
information, expression, ideas, and facts, embracing such things as custom er and
supplier lists, financial information, methods of doing business, future marketing,
sales and product plans and even employee names, job responsibilities and
phone numbers.”)).
79 See VAN L INDBERG, INTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY AND O PEN S O URCE : A P RACTICAL GUIDE TO PROTECTING CODE 130–31 (Andy Oram, ed., 2008) (discussing
Google’s use of trade secrecy).
80 Mattioli, supra note 8, at 583.
81 Asunción Esteve, The Business of Personal Data: Google, Facebook, and
Privacy Issues in the EU and the USA, 7 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 36, 36 (2017).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 40.
84 Id.
76
77
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secret law would be counterintuitive.85 “[T]rade secret law would
slow the pace of ... innovation” in the data industry and limit tra de
in the digital market.86 Any business that decided to enter the
digital market would forfeit the property rights it had within the
data the business collected and organized.87 While the Technologic Giants, with their constant influx of data, have maximized
their profits without private ownership of data, new companies
would be pushed out once their property rights were quashed.88
Since neither federal nor state intellectual property law provides a legal method to establish property rights in data, policymakers and companies have sought to create a sui generis statutory regime of legal protection for organized data.89 By creating
a statutory regime that recognizes big data as a legal good, policymakers could finally address the privacy issues of big data as
well as apply free trade principles to the digital market.90
B. A Statutory Regime Recognizing Data as a Commodity Would
Allow Policymakers to Address Privacy Issues as well as Apply
Free Trade Policies
Privacy of personal data is an important issue that underpins
trust in the digital trade.91 The data overflow presents concerns
for privacy rights that, when left unaddressed, dampen the data
economy and innovation.92 A statutory regime would offer policymakers the chance to find “a balance between the beneficial
uses of data and individual privacy,” as well as apply free trade
principles to the digital market.93
Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky discuss privacy concerns
in the digital age in the article Big Data for All: Privacy and User
Control in the Age of Analytics.94 Tene and Polonetsky assert that
See Mattioli, supra note 8, at 551.
Id.
87 Id. at 538.
88 See Kim et al., supra note 39, at 94 (discussing how the Technologic Giants maintain their monopoly on data through the digital divide).
89 See Mattioli, supra note 8, at 580.
90 See id. at 583.
91 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 60, at 239.
92 Id.
93 See id.; see also Mattioli, supra note 8, at 583.
94 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 60, at 239, 251.
85
86
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“the accumulation of personal data has an incremental adverse
effects [sic] on privacy”95 Researchers can draw different conclusions from an individual’s online activity, and once data is linked
to an identified individual, it becomes difficult to disentangle.96
“Once any piece of data has been linked to a person’s real identity
any association between this data and a virtual identity breaks anonymity of the latter.”97 Tene and Polonetsky warn that “this incremental effect will lead to a ‘database of ruin,’ chewing away at an
individual’s privacy until his or her profile is completely exposed.”98
Tene and Polonetsky concede that opening up an individual’s virtual profile gives businesses predictive analysis that can
be beneficial in numerous areas of society including healthcare,
law enforcement, and national security.99 However, “[p]redictive
analysis is particularly problematic when based on sensitive categories ... such as ... race, [gender] or sexuality.”100 “This type of
activity, while clearly unconstitutional under existing U.S. law,
is not so far-fetched in other parts of the world.”101
A statutory scheme that regulates data as a commodity exchanged between not only business-to-business but also consumerto-business could allow the digital market to expand while also
addressing privacy issues.102 Tene and Polonetsky claim that open
access between individuals and businesses offers a solution to
privacy issues as the big data market expands.103 The three components come together to promote transparency between individual
users and the companies that want their data.104 The call for
Id. at 251.
Id.
97 Id. (quoting Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, 2008 IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 119).
98 Id. at 251–52.
99 Id. at 253.
100 Id. at 253–54 (“It is one thing to recommend for a customer books, music or movies she might be interested in based on her previous purchases; it is
quite another thing to identify when she is pregnant before her closest family
knows.”). Id.
101 Id. at 254.
102 See id. at 263 (discussing that a framework for big data must balance
with a privacy framework to allow individuals their privacy rights while also
creating additional opportunity for efficient value creation and innovation in
the digital market).
103 Id.
104 See id.
95
96
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transparency is not new, but Tene and Polonetsky emphasize
individuals’ access to data in a usable format, which can create
value to individuals and ensure better protection of privacy
rights.105 A statutory framework formally recognizing a transaction between individuals and businesses where an individual’s
personal data is exchanged for goods and services could address
privacy issues, promote transparency, and still allow the digital
market to expand under free trade.106
This Note emphasizes, however, that a statutory framework
should still limit property rights in raw data. Raw data “should
be regarded as neither an exclusive asset of individuals ... nor
exclusively the property of businesses.”107 As discussed previously,
data is a raw material of production.108 Businesses create value
in big data once the analytical infrastructure compiles, organizes,
and stores the data.109 Establishing property rights in raw data
could eviscerate the competitive advantage companies gain when
investing significant resources to organize and share data in
commercially valuable ways, thereby stifling innovation within
the digital market.110 Recognizing the rights of individuals to
access their data balances their right to privacy, invites scrutiny
into businesses’ data practices, and exposes potential misuses in
data prior to a business ever establishing property rights within
the data in which they invest.111
III. CHALLENGES TO THE FREE TRADE OF DATA: C YBERSECURITY
THREATS AND REGULATIONS
The conventional idea is that private and public data infrastructures are susceptible to catastrophic cyberattacks that could
leave consumers, enterprises and governments vulnerable.112 As
Id. at 268.
See id.
107 Id. at 269.
108 See supra notes 60–69 and accompanying text.
109 Id.
110 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 60, at 269.
111 Id. at 268.
112 Nathan A. Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 N W. L. REV. 1503,
1503 (2013).
105
106

2018] DIGITAL GOLD: CYBERSECURITY REGULATIONS 309
an increasing portion of the world embraces the digital era, cyberattacks “can now affect critical infrastructure, turn smartphones
into monitoring devices, and put the safety of healthcare patients
at risk.”113 To protect consumer data and private infrastructures,
over fifty governments worldwide have developed cybersecurity
strategies and regulations.114 These government policies range
from strong government control over both domestic and international flows of data to and from their borders, to voluntary regulations that promote coordination between the government and
private companies.115 This Section will first give a brief history
of cyber threats and then discuss how cybersecurity regulations
in the United States, the European Union and China have advanced to address future cyberattacks.
A. The History of Cybersecurity Threats
Breaches of data and information have existed as long as
companies have stored digital information.116 Public awareness
of large-scale data breaches parallels the growth of computer access
in the 1980s and 1990s.117 As technology grows, governments a nd
businesses store more information digitally, increasing efficiency
but exposing more information to possible cyberattacks.118 Since
2005, “the advancement of technology and proliferation of electronic data throughout the world,” has made “data breaches a
top concern for both enterprises and consumers.”119
2017 Emerging Cyber Threats, Trends & Technologies Report , G A . T ECH .
INST. FOR INFO . SEC. & PRIV. 1 (2017), http://www.iisp.gatech.edu/sites/default
/files/documents/2017_threats_report_finalblu-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ET
2J-XWSF].
114 Allan A. Friedman, Cybersecurity and Trade: National Policies, Global
and Local Consequences, BROOKINGS 1 (2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp
-content/uploads/2016/06/BrookingsCybersecurityNEW.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/MCV6-C5LE].
115 See, e.g., id.; Overview of China’s Cybersecurity Law, KPMG 6–7 (2017),
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/cn/pdf/en/2017/02/overview-of-cy
bersecurity-law.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BPK-CVFU].
116 Nathan Lord, The History of Data Breaches, DIGI. GUARDIAN (July 27,
2017), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-data-breaches [https://perma
.cc/3TG9-6B3M].
117 Id.
118 See id.
119 Id.
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The first major cybersecurity threat the world faced was
the emergence of malicious software.120 In 1988, the first Internet worm, the Morris worm, infected ten percent of the Internet.121
This worm’s “self-replication flooded many networks with an overload of traffic ... temporarily [disabling] approximately six thousand
computers, including machines at NASA, some major universities,
and several military bases.”122 However, system administrators
were soon able to detect the worm and run a defense program.123
Ultimately, the worm was a victim of its own success. The Morris
worm was poor at determining whether or not a system was
already infected, targets were soon infected with multiple copies
of the worm running simultaneously. As copies scanned for
new targets, the resulting exponential increase in the load on
individual computers and network connections tipped off system
administrators. 124

The Morris worm was a landmark event in cybersecurity,
leading to public awareness of “the potential that such attacks
held for mass electronic destruction.”125
The pace and magnitude of cyberattacks have increased since
the foundations of cyber breaches in the 1990s.126 Between 2005
and 2015, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse reported more than
4,500 data breaches, resulting in more than 816 million individual
records breached.127 “In actuality, the numbers are [probably]
much higher, as the total number of records breached reported
by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse includes breach reports for
which the number of records breached is unknown.”128 “Additionally, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse is not a comprehensive
See Stephen Cass, Anatomy of Malice, IEEE SPECTRUM (2001), https://
spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/internet/anatomy-of-malice
[https://perma.cc/TE
9Z-XLTT].
121 Id.
122 The Social Impact of Viruses, STAN. (Nov. 27, 2017), http://cs.stanford
.edu/people/eroberts/cs201/projects/2000-01/viruses/social.html# [https://perma
.cc/R4VB-9XUP].
123 See Cass, supra note 120.
124 Id.
125 The Social Impact of Viruses, supra note 122.
126 See Lord, supra note 116.
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compilation of all breach data, so the actual ... [cumulative harm
from data breaches] is likely substantially higher.”129
The prime example of this is the financial and insurance
data breaches that occurred in recent years.130 For example, in
2013, the largest bank in the United States, JP Morgan & Chase
(JP Morgan), reported that private information from seventy-six
million households and eight million small businesses was exposed
in a monumental cyberattack.131 JP Morgan, on the other hand,
“was seen as one of the best at security.”132 Financial institutions store “everything from social security numbers to detailed
records of past spending.”133 As a result, financial institutions
invest heavily in their cybersecurity programs.134 JP Morgan
currently spends $500 million per year on cybersecurity alone to
protect its data infrastructure and the sensitive information it
stores.135 Thus, what was most alarming about the JP Morgan
breach was how prepared the company was and how little difference it made.136
The JP Morgan breach indicated that cyberattacks may be
an unavoidable consequence of collecting and storing this much
sensitive information:137 “[a]s innovative uses of the Internet by
business and government organizations increases, so do the number
Id.
See, e.g., Lorenzo Ligato, The 9 Biggest Data Breaches Of All Time,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/big
gest-worst-data-breaches-hacks_us_55d4b5a5e4b07addcb44fd9e [https://perma
.cc/NAH9-QAD8].
131 Jake Swearingen, Why the JP Morgan Data Breach Is Like No Other,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014
/10/why-the-jp-morgan-data-breach-is-like-no-other/381098/
[https://perma.cc
/9SEU-BKZU] (“Previous data breaches had been confined to retail companies
(Target, Home Depot, etc.), where brands [were] required to meet basic security
protocols and not much else.”).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Steve Morgan, Why J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Is Spending A Half Billion
Dollars On Cybersecurity, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2016, 9:02 AM), https: / / www. for bes
.com/sites/stevemorgan/2016/01/30/why-j-p-morgan-chase-co-is-spending-a-half
-billion-dollars-on-cybersecurity/#19621a025991 [https://perma.cc/7BJD-973U].
135 Id.
136 See id.
137 Warren W. Fisher et al., The Unavoidable Risk of Cloud Computing, 1
J. BUS. ISSUES 1, 1 (2009), http://www.jrhasselback.com/Journal/JBI2009-1.pdf
#page=5 [https://perma.cc/5SFQ-ZMGF].
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of threats to information system security.”138 Even with current
technology, many scholars suggest that large-scale information
collection creates “risk[s] [that] cannot completely be avoided.” 139
When considering future cyberattacks, policymakers and
scholars warn that attacks will shift from data and information
theft to cyberterrorism.140 As the digital revolution spreads and
captures more sectors, technology that is fundamental to society—
such as power grids, water service, or air traffic control—could be at
risk.141 Cyber threats are always evolving.142 However, as the
number, severity, and sophistication of attacks progresses so
does the development of better action to protect businesses and
individuals.143
B. Major Cybersecurity Actions in the United States, the European
Union, and China
“Cybercrimes are borderless crimes where the repercussions
and consequences are endless.”144 A cybersecurity regulation involves directives to protect information technology and computer
systems with the purpose of enforcing safety mandates on companies and organizations to protect their infrastructure and data from
cyberattacks.145 As cyberattacks become more and more common,
countries are beginning to take part in both private and public
cyber-safety actions.146 Many countries established their own
Id.
Id.
140 But see James A. Lewis, Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War
and Other Cyber Threats, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (2002), https://
www.steptoe.com/publications/231a.pdf [https://perma.cc/XYU4-ADB5].
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See JOHN ARQUILLA & DAVID RONFELDT, N ETWORKS AND N ETWARS: T HE
FUTURE OF TERROR, CRIME AND MILITANCY 283 (John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt
eds., 2001).
144 Charletta E. Anderson-Fortson, Cyber Security and the Need for International Governance, N AT’L L. REV. (2016), https://www.natlawreview.com/ar
ticle/cyber-security-and-need-international-governance
[https://perma.cc
/D3QS-X77E].
145 See Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 102(4), 129 Stat.
2242, 2936 (2015).
146 Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 2017, INT’ L T ELECOMM. U NION iii, 1
(2017),
https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2017-PDF-E
.pdf [https://perma.cc/945K-VZP8].
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cybersecurity regulations with unique standards and approaches
to digital safety.147
1. The United States
The role of the federal government in cybersecurity involves coordinating with private entities to secure both federal
and nonfederal systems.148 On December 18, 2015, President
Obama signed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (the Cyber Act) into
law.149 The Cyber Act is landmark legislation that established
the first broad mechanism under which the federal government,
specifically the Department of Homeland Security, can begin
standardizing cybersecurity.150
The Act ... establishes a mechanism for cybersecurity information
sharing among the private-sector and federal government entities. It also provides safe harbors from liability for private entities that share cybersecurity information in accordance with
certain procedures, and it authorizes various entities, including [many] outside the federal government, to monitor certain
information systems and operate defense measures for cybersecurity purposes. The Act also contains provisions designed
to bolster cybersecurity protections at federal agencies, assess
the federal government’s cybersecurity workforce, and implement
a range of measures intended to improve the cybersecurity
preparedness of critical information systems and networks. 151

The Cyber Act also requires that nonfederal entities review information that will be shared or utilized by those entities
See id.
Eric A. Fischer, Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview o f Majo r
Issues, Current Laws, and Proposed Legislation, CONG. R ES . S ERV . 1, 15 (2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UQS-263H].
149 Keith M. Gerver, President Obama Signs Cybersecurity Act of 2015 to
Encourage Cybersecurity Information Sharing, NAT’L L. REV. 1 (2016), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/president-obama-signs-cybersecurity-act-2015
-to-encourage-cybersecurity-inform ation [https://perma.cc/V4JT-FP3W].
150 What You Need to Know About the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, L ATHAM &
WATKINS 1, (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-Cyber
security-Act-of-2015 [https://perma.cc/ZV3J-SWAA].
151 The Cybersecurity Act of 2015, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 1 (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_The_Cybersec u
rity_Act_of_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZW2-6TEF].
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to remove any information that the entities “know[] at the time
of sharing” to be personally identified information not directly
related to cybersecurity.152
Instead of a hardline regulatory approach, President Obama
claimed the “only ... way to defend America from these cyber
threats ... is through government and industry working together,
sharing appropriate information as true partners.”153 The framework is designed to help businesses decide how to create new
cybersecurity systems and implement new cybersecurity techniques as compared with prominent techniques used within the
same industry.154
In May 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order
13800, entitled “Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure,” which largely builds off the
Obama Administration’s cybersecurity policies.155 The executive
order draws directly on the Cyber Act’s policy aim of producing a
plan “to address the risk of multiple simultaneous cyber incidents
affecting critical infrastructure,”156 and applying standards for
risk management set in the National Institute of Standards and
Technology’s framework for protecting critical infrastructures.157
Trump’s executive order made key additions to U.S. cybersecurity policy, including directly assigning accountability to
the heads of executive departments and agencies “for managing
cybersecurity risk to their enterprises.”158 However, the executive order also reasserts that “because risk management decisions
made by agency heads can affect the risk to the executive branch
as a whole, ... cybersecurity risks [constitute] ... an executive branch
Cybersecurity Act of 2015, supra note 145, at § 103(b)(1)(E)(i).
Katie Zezima, Obama signs executive order on sharing cybersecurity
threat information, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/02/12/obama-to-sign-executive-order-on-cyber
security-threats/?utm_term=.17d2e9d08c3b [https://perma.cc/QGS7-LBFC].
154 Id.
155 Exec. Order No. 13800, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,391 (May 16, 2017).
156 Cybersecurity Act of 2015, supra note 145, at § 208; see also id. § 2(b)
(following the Cybersecurity Act of 2015’s goal of establishing a plan to protect and support critical infrastructure, but also specifically assigning agency
heads to meet and collaborate proactive defense strategies).
157 Exec. Order No. 13800 § 1(c)(i–ii) (May 11, 2017).
158 Id. § 1(a).
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enterprise,” and will be addressed through the full power of the
executive, not merely the federal agencies.159 Another key element
of the executive order is the “market transparency” provision.160
This provision aims to “promote appropriate market transparency
of cybersecurity risk management practices by critical infrastructure entities” in both the public and private sectors.161
Trump’s executive order is far from a comprehensive
regulation—“[t]he final order goes ... much [more] ... [in-]depth
on policy goals” as opposed to addressing how to actually meet
them.162 The only true action the executive order implements in
the present is evaluating federal agencies’ current cybersecurity
practices and requiring the initial steps to coordinate policies
between the Department of Homeland Security, Department of
Justice, and Department of Commerce.163 The current actions being
taken appear to be merely precursors to eventually creating a
broader cybersecurity policy.164 But for now, the federal approach
to cybersecurity is no more than far-reaching policy goals coupled
with a framework to eventually create a centralized cybersecurity
regulation in the future.165
On the state level, at least forty-two states have introduced
more than 240 cybersecurity-related bills or resolutions.166 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, the key
areas of state legislative activity include “[i]mproving government
security practices ... commissions, task forces[,] and studies [on
cyber security] ... [f]unding for cybersecurity programs and initiatives ... [t]argeting computer crimes ... [r]estricting public disclosure of sensitive security information [and] ... [p]romoting
workforce, training, [and] economic development.”167
Id.
Id. § 2(c).
161 Id.
162 But see Sean Gallagher, Something about Trump cybersecurity executive order seems awfully familiar, ARS TECHNICA (May 18, 2017), https://ars
technica.com/tech-policy/2017/05/the-text-and-subtext-of-trumps-cyber-execu
tive-order/ [https://perma.cc/LV8J-ZBR8].
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 Cybersecurity Legislation 2017, N AT’ L CONF. OF STATE L EGIS. (Dec. 29,
2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-tech
nology/cybersecurity-legislation-2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/82R6-4TWU].
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While some of these actions have been performed at the
federal level, “[s]tate regulation of cybersecurity [generally] stand[s]
apart from federal standards.”168 First, state laws are able to focus
more on consumer protection as opposed to the defense of largescale infrastructure.169 Second, state statutes often include a
reasonableness standard for the data security efforts of entities
that manage personal information.170 In 2002, Minnesota enacted
a cybersecurity statute requiring internet service providers to take
“reasonable steps to maintain the security and privacy of a consumer’s personally identifiable information.”171 Since then “thirteen
other states have issued broader data security mandates generally requiring any entity ... that manages ‘personal information’
to employ reasonable data security practices.”172
Although these commonalities may suggest that there is a
harmonized approach to cybersecurity across US states, this is far
from the case.173 “Each state statute [usually] applies ... [different
standards of safety] to different categories of data.” 174 Moreover,
the term “reasonable data security” allows for a range of interpretations within different state legislatures and state judicial
systems.175 This sort of flexibility has caused states to diverge
from any sort of common regulatory approach.176 For example, the
California Attorney General released the California Data Breach
Report in 2016, which referenced specific standards for defining
“reasonableness,” providing that, “the failure to implement all
the [Center for Internet Security’s Critical Security] controls that
apply to an organization’s environmental constitutes a lack of
reasonable security” under California’s cybersecurity statute.177
David Forscey et al., Cybersecurity Is The Next Frontier Of State Regulation,
LAW360 (May 11, 2017, 1:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/922786/cy
bersecurity-is-the-next-frontier-of-state-regulation [http://perma.cc/A59M-GW54].
169 Id.
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171 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325M.05 (West 2002).
172 Forscey et al., supra note 168.
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177 California Attorney General Releases Report Defining “Reasonable” Data
Security, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH: PRIVACY & INFO . SECURITY L. BLOG
(Feb. 19, 2016) (citing California Data Breach Report 2012–2015), https://www
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California’s working definition of “reasonable” data security differs
significantly from many other states like Minnesota’s that requires
“reasonable steps to maintain the security and privacy,” which is a
far more vague and open to a wide variety of interpretations.178
These diverging standards can impose significant burdens
on companies, especially small businesses, that actively use and
store data.179 Based on the variations in each state, businesses
will have to comply with dozens of different cybersecurity standards to enter different markets within the United States.180 Additionally, businesses must consider the costs of fitting into these
regulations and the risk of potential legal exposure under each
state law against the potential profits.181 Without a more unified
standard, many businesses are kept out of digital markets within different states.182
2. The European Union
On April 14, 2016, the EU Parliament approved the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).183 The GDPR was designed to
“harmonize data privacy laws across Europe, to protect and empower all EU citizens data privacy and to reshape the way organizations across the region approach data privacy.”184 Since the
European Commission first proposed a unified approach to cybersecurity, the legislation has attracted attention from the international community.185 “[Enterprises] across the EU and beyond
have been frustrated by the increasing lack of [harmonization]
across the Member States, despite data flowing increasingly without
.huntonprivacyblog.com/2016/02/19/california-attorney-general-releases-report-de
fining-reasonable-data-security/ [https://perma.cc/3PTH-6TFC].
178 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325M.05 (West 2002).
179 Forscey et al., supra note 168.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 T HE EU GENERAL DATA P ROTECTION REGULATION (Dec. 1, 2017), https:/ /
www.eugdpr.org [https://perma.cc/GX6E-HQV2].
184 Id.
185 The EU General Data Protection Regulation, ALLEN & OVERY (2017),
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/data-protection/Pages/default
.aspx [https://perma.cc/6DAR-KJ98].
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boundaries.”186 The EU institutions have since risen to the task: the
adoption of the GDPR was a milestone in data protection law.187
The GDPR updates the EU’s 1995 Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC.188 Although the key principles of data privacy established in the previous directive remain, the GDPR made many
changes to the regulatory policy.189 The biggest change to the
regulatory landscape comes with the extended jurisdiction of the
GDPR, applying “to all companies processing the personal data
of data subjects residing in the Union, regardless of the company’s
location.”190 The previous territorial applicability under the directive referred to data process “in context of [the activities] of
an establishment,” as opposed to the “data subjects.” 191 The GDPR
makes its application very clear: “it will apply to the processing
of personal data by controllers and processors in the EU, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the EU or not.”192
In addition, the GDPR will also have extraterritorial applicability to data controllers or processors that are not even established
in the EU where the activities relate to: “offering goods or services to EU citizens (irrespective of whether payment is required)
and the monitoring of behavior that takes place within the EU .” 193
Also, to represent their interest in data sharing within member
states and facilitate smoother compliance, “[n]on-E[U] businesses processing the data of EU citizens will also have to appoint a
representative in the EU.”194
The GDPR also established new penalties for organizations in breach.195 As a maximum penalty, organizations in breach
Id.
Id.
188 An Overview of the Main Changes Under the GDPR and How They Differ from the Previous Directive, THE EU GEN. DATA PROTECTION REG . (Dec. 1,
2017) [hereinafter EUGDPR], https://www.eugdpr.org/the-regulation.html [https://
perma.cc/R89B-3CC4].
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191Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 4, 1995 O.J. (L 266) [https://perma.cc
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192 EUGDPR, supra note 188.
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of the GDPR “can be fined up to four percent of annual global
turnover or €20 Million (whichever is greater).”196 There is a “tiered
approach to fines” under the GDPR based on the seriousness of
the infringement.197 Additionally, based on the GDPR’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, rules apply to all controllers and processors
that deal in EU citizens personal data, meaning cloud storage an d
processing will no longer be exempt from the EU’s regulatory
enforcement and penalties.198
Finally, the GDPR expanded “data subject” rights, which
provides individuals a wide array of rights that can be enforced
against any organizations processing personal data.199 At its core,
data subject rights enforce the GDPR’s “privacy by design” concept.200 Privacy by design calls for “the inclusion of data protection from the onset of the designing of systems, rather than an
addition.”201 More specifically, Article 28 states “[t]he controller
shall ... implement appropriate technical and organizational me asures ... in an effective way ... in order to meet the requirements
of this Regulation.”202 Furthermore, Article 23 calls for controllers to
process only the data “absolutely necessary for the completion of
its duties,” and limits access to personal data to only those
“need[ed] to act out the processing.”203 The fundamental data
subject rights the GDPR added to EU data protection law include: the right to access, the right to be forgotten, and the right
to restrict processing.204
Id.
Id.
198 EUGDPR, supra note 188.
199 Detlev Gabel & Tim Hickman, Chapter 9: Rights of data subjects—
Unlocking the EU General Data Protection Regulation, WHITE & C ASE (Sept. 13,
2017),
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-subjects-unlocking-eu-general-data-protection-regulation
[https://perma.cc
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202 Council Regulation 697/2016/EC Apr. 27, 2016, The General Data Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L 119/1) art. 28(1) [hereinafter General Data
Protection Regulation], https://web.archive.org/web/20171013160353/http://ec
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The right to access is a feature necessary to ensure data
subjects are able to enforce their data protection rights under the
GDPR.205 “The GDPR expand[ed] the mandatory categories of
information which must be supplied in connection with data subject access request[s].”206 Under Article 15, data subjects have
the right to obtain a copy of the personal data the controller processes as well as general information about where the controller
is processing their data, the purpose of processing, the category
of data being processed, and the recipients who will have access
to the data.207
The right to be forgotten, or “Data Erasure,” entitles the
data subject to require the controller to delete the subject’s data,
terminate additional distribution, and potentially have third parties
cease processing his or her personal data.208 However, data subjects must meet one of the reasons for erasure as outlined in
Article 17, which include but are not limited to: (1) that the data
is no longer needed for its lawful, original purpose, (2) that the
lawful basis for the processing is the data subject’s consent which
may be withdrawn, or (3) erasure is necessary to comply with
EU law or national law of the Member State.209
Finally, a new concept in the GDPR is the right to restrict
processing.210 “In some circumstances, data subjects may not be
entitled to require the controller to erase their personal data but
may be entitled to limit the purposes for which the controller
can process [that] data.”211 Nevertheless, this right is usually
coupled with the right to erasure as a temporary means to protect the data subject until the governing body can make a formal
decision on an erasure request.212 Data subjects have the right
to restrict the processing of personal data if: (1) the accuracy of
the data is contested,213 (2) the processing is unlawful and the
Id.
Id.
207 General Data Protection Regulation, art. 15(1)(a)–(h).
208 Id. at art. 17(1)(a)–(f).
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data subject requests restriction as opposed to erasure, (3) the
controller no longer needs the data for the original purpose but th e
data is still necessary for the controller to establish or defend a
legal right, or (4) verification of overriding grounds is pending
during the context of an erasure.214
Overall, the GDPR’s expansion of data subject rights has
created new burdens for firms and businesses accessing and processing EU data.215 Organizations now face a much broader range
of circumstances in which data subjects can trigger administrative burdens and outright loss of access to consumer information. 216
The GDPR’s focus on transparency and accountability puts
individuals and their rights at the heart of the GDPR. Controllers will need to consider all aspects of their processing activities
in light of the rights afforded to individuals, so that they will
ultimately be in a position to demonstrate compliance not only
when individuals seek to exercise those rights, but with their
overall obligations under the GDPR. 217

3. China
The Chinese Cybersecurity Law (CSL) came into effect on
June 1, 2017, becoming the first comprehensive law to address
cybersecurity concerns in China.218 The law imposes new security
standards for both cyber and physical aspects of networks including strict data localization regulations, increased government access
to cyber activities, and monetary penalties for non-compliance.219
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China’s move to strengthen its cybersecurity regulations is not
dissimilar to the global shift in favor of tighter cybersecurity.220
“China is a vocal proponent of ‘cyberspace sovereignty,’ a theory
that [advocates the right for the] state[] ... to [exclusively] regulate
the internet activity within their border[].”221 However, the application of CSL has been surrounded by controversy, particularly
from the international business community.222
The CSL expressly applies to two entities: “Network Operators” and “Critical Information Infrastructure Operators.” 223
Network operators are defined as “owners, operators, and service providers of networks.”224 This definition is extremely vague
and can be broadly interpreted to include any organization that
operates a computer network or data storage unit in China.225
Thus, a Chinese or foreign company that collects data and information by providing services, conducting business activities,
or even just hosting a website in China is likely subject to CSL
regulations as a “Network Operator”.226
Network operators are obligated to “safeguard their networks against disruption, damage or unauthorized access, and
to prevent data leakage, theft or tampering.”227 CSL requires network operators to build an effective and clear security system
within their organizations and find “rational technical solutions”
to improving data protection and mitigating network risks.228
Law, REED SMITH (July 6, 2017), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives
/2017/07/new-developments-in-chinas-cybersecurity-law.
220 Ramsey & Wootliff, supra note 218.
221 See China Passes New Cybersecurity Law, supra note 219, at 2.
222 Cate Cadell & Michael Martina, Foreign business groups push for delay
in controversial China cyber law, REUTERS (May 12, 2017, 5:40 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-china-cyber-law/foreign-business-groups-push-for
-delay-in-controversial-china-cyber-law-idUSKBN188156
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Network operators will also be subject to specific rules depending
on their classification under the Multi-level Network Security
Protection Scheme.229 The Multi-level Network Security Protection Scheme is an existing regulation that requires companies to
meet certain security standards based on an evaluation of the
information companies are gathering and the potential threat to
national security a breach would create.230
“Critical Information Infrastructure Operators” are a subset of “Network Operators” that “are subject to notably stricter
requirements.”231 While this is a key distinction under the regulation, the CSL does not clearly define a “Critical Information
Infrastructure Operator.”232 Article 31 provides a non-exhaustive
list of industrial sectors that are considered “critical information
infrastructure,”233 with a catchall provision that includes “infrastructure that, in the event of damage, loss of function, or data
leak, might seriously endanger national security, national welfare or the livelihoods of the people, or the public interest.” 234
This broad definition means that any company that is a supplier
to a critical sector, as well as any company that holds a significant amount of information on Chinese citizens, could become a
target for regulations under the CSL.235
Organizations that are classified critical information infrastructure operators must regularly assess their cyber risk in
accordance with Article 38 of the CSL.236 The largest change in
the CSL is that all personal information and important data
China Passes New Cybersecurity Law, supra note 219.
National Security and China’s Information Security Standards, CTR . F OR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.csis.org/analysis/na
tional-security-and-china’s-information-security-standard
[https://perma.cc
/NW7C-WWSY].
231 An In-Depth Examination of China’s New Cybersecurity Law Part I:
Who Must Comply?, supra note 223.
232 See id.
233 The CSL references the following industry sectors as “critical information
infrastructures”: “public communication, information services, energy, transportation, water, finance, public services, and e-government.” Id.
234 See id.; see also China Passes New Cybersecurity Law, supra note 219,
at 2.
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that critical information infrastructure operators collect in China
must be stored domestically.237 If an organization needs to transmit data offshore, a designated government agency must conduct a
security assessment and the transferred data must be adjusted
to best fit the CSL requirements.238 Thus, organizations that
operate critical information infrastructures in China and transmit data to headquarters, partners, or suppliers overseas will
need to reassess and reorganize their approach to data collection
and storage.239
Finally, the CSL added specific penalties for foreign offen ders.240 “In addition to the usual penalties for non-compliance241 ...
the new Law provides for specific penalties such as the freezing of
assets or other sanctions” to any foreign organization or individuals that attack or harm any critical information infrastructures
in China.242
Companies operating in China or seeking access to Chinese
markets, must evaluate how the new laws may impact operations.243 While the CSL does seek to balance the dual goals of
enhancing cybersecurity and developing the digital economy
through the free flow of data,244 overseas opposition groups lobbied hard to delay the CSL implementation.245 Industry groups
claim that the influx of new measures gives the Chinese government “unprecedented access to foreign companies’ technology”
and the information they collect through the movement of data . 246
Furthermore, more than fifty trade associations and chambers of
commerce signed a letter in May 2017 in an effort to delay the
CSL’s implementation, arguing “the law could affect billions of
Id. at 12.
Id.
239 Id.
240 China Passes New Cybersecurity Law, supra note 219, at 3.
241 Typical penalties usually include “warnings, suspension of operations,
revocation of licenses, fines set within a fixed range.” Id.
242 Id.
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244 Id. at 1.
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CHINA MORNING POST (May 25, 2017), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/eco
nomy/article/2095595/foreign-firms-grapple-chinas-punitive-cybersecurity-laws
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dollars of cross-border trade and lock out foreign cloud operators
because of limits on how they operate in the country.”247 Moreover,
according to the letter from bodies representing businesses based
in the United States, Europe, Japan, Korea, Australia and elsewhere, “[t]hese measures will add costly burdens, restrict competition and may decrease the security of products and [jeopardize]
the privacy of Chinese citizens.”248
IV. AN I NTERNATIONAL C ONVENTION ON CYBERSECURITY AND THE
FREE TRADE OF DATA
Cyberspace has been notoriously difficult to regulate.249
Large-scale regulations require coordination between governments
and many private companies with many different infrastructures.250 Moreover, policyholders also must consider the balance
between individual privacy rights and potential business growth,
making cybersecurity a novel issue.251
While cybercrimes have obvious effects on economic activity, cybersecurity can have similar negative economic implications “if only because of its’ high cost and deliberate information
inefficiencies due to deliberate isolation of networks.”252 In other
words, cyberattacks harm the economy, and without a coordinated
approach to cybersecurity, the digital market is bogged down with
“information inefficiencies.”253 Likewise, “no nation-state can
achieve adequate cybersecurity on its own;” cybercrimes do not
respect geographic or political borders, and without international coordination, economic ramifications are merely surface issues to the idea of cyberwarfare.254
Id.
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249 Touring the World of Cybersecurity Law, RSA CONF. 3 (Feb. 29, 2016),
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To address the shortcomings of the current, decentralized
cybersecurity system, an international platform should recognize a convention ensuring a coordinated, multilateral strategy
to address cybersecurity.255 Also, to balance the overhaul of regulations that come with an international agreement, the WTO
should update trade policies to include big data as a formal, regulated commodity in which free trade efforts must apply to the
fullest extent possible.256
A. A Multilateral Convention on an International Platform
Cybercrimes are transnational and require a transnational
response.257 The current decentralized measures the private and
public sectors provide cannot reach the adequate level of security
necessary to promote the digital trade while also protecting consumers.258 The speed and technical complexity of cyber-activity
need a “prearranged, agreed procedures for cooperation in investigating and responding to threats and attacks.”259
In 1999, members of government, industry, NGOs, and academia, from many nations, met at Stanford University’s Center
for International Security and Cooperation to discuss a potential
plan for an international agreement concerning cybersecurity.260
The Stanford meeting drafted a multilateral cybersecurity convention, titled the “Proposal for an International Convention on
Cyber Crime and Terrorism.”261 The Proposal argues that an international convention on cybersecurity would ensure that State
Parties unanimously:
x

“adopt laws making dangerous cyber activities
criminal;

Abraham D. Sofaer et al., A Proposal for an International Convention
on Cyber Crime and Terrorism, STAN. U., i (Aug. 2000), https://fsi-live.s3.us-west
-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/sofaergoodman.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZSJ-JB27].
256 See Diane A. MacDonald & Christine M. Streatfeild, Personal Data
Privacy and the WTO, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 625, 633 (2014).
257 Sofaer et al., supra note 255, at ii.
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260 Id. at i.
261 See id.
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x
x
x

enforce those laws or extradite criminals for prosecution by other States;
cooperate in investigating criminal activities an d
in providing usable evidence for prosecutions; and
participate in formulating and agree to adopt an d
implement standards and practices that enhance
safety and security.”262

An international agency created pursuant to the Convention
would provide a forum for “international discussion, ongoing
response to technological developments, and technical assistance
to developing States.”263 The Proposal suggests that policymakers
form the international “Agency for Information Infrastructure P rotection” to serve as a “formal structure in which interested groups
will cooperate through experts in countries around the world in
developing standards and practices concerning cyber security.” 264
The challenge of controlling cybercrimes requires a full
range of responses, including both voluntary and legally mandated cooperation.265 An international cybersecurity agreement
will only be possible, however, if policymakers can take into account the “substantial differences that exist between activities
regulated by established international regimes and cyber systems”
while also integrating the new policies to help standardize cybersecurity efforts.266 Considerable financial burdens and sovereignty
issues are byproducts of unifying cybersecurity efforts.267 “Many
states will be unprepared … to agree to limit their control of cyber
activities they regard as essential” to the national and economic
security interests.268 Cooperation between developed and developing nations is essential to the “development and implementation
of technological solutions and standards to enhance the capacity
Id. at ii.
Sofaer et al., supra note 255, at ii.
264 Id. at iv.
265 Id. at 2.
266 See ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, P ROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING
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of states and users effectively to protect computers and systems
from future attacks.”269
“The globally-interconnected digital information and communication infrastructure known as cyberspace underpins almost
every facet of modern society and provides critical support for
the U.S. economy, civil infrastructure, public safety, and national
security.”270 Currently, many believe that cybersecurity as a concept involves only national or industry-based security standards
and consumer privacy laws.271 An international agreement on cybersecurity could focus more on “Internet governance,” which
involves balancing “human rights and the economic and developmental interests associated with a vibrant, innovative, and
competitive [information and communication technology]272 sector” with state security interests.273 States should consider the
high potential benefits of an international cybersecurity agreement
against some administrative and sovereignty burdens.274
Scholars still debate whether states should address cybersecurity issues through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) or the United Nations (U.N.).275 NATO is arguably the
most important collective defense and has already addressed cyber
threats in policy and operational terms.276 In 2002, the NATO Summit in Prague established the Cyber Defense Program to create a
unified front to defend against cyberattacks.277 The Cyber Defense
Program then created the NATO Computer Incident Response
Capability to further provide NATO with procedures to “prevent,
Sofaer et al., supra note 255, at 2.
Melissa Hathaway, Securing Our Digital Future, WHITE HOUSE (May 29,
2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/05/29/securing-our-digi
tal-future [https://perma.cc/NYY9-VWPP].
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&context=facpub.
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detect, and respond to cyber threats.”278 Despite NATO’s preventative approach, the cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007 revealed
NATO’s inadequacy in cyber-protection.279 The Estonian incident
“helped bring the stakes of cyber threats into sharper perspective for NATO” and sparked a significant restoration in NATO’s
political commitment and operational capabilities to address cybercrimes.280 NATO has continually given prominence to cyberdefense strategies through the Strategic Concept adopted at the
Lisbon summit in 2010, the Cyber Defense Concept, Policy, and
Action Plan in 2011 and the Chicago summit declaration in 2012.281
The U.N. has been less forthcoming on international coordination for cybersecurity policies.282 The first major work emerged
in 2001 with the U.N. Convention on Cybercrime.283 The treaty
signified the first international treaty
to define and standardize responses to Internet crimes. It sought
to bridge the gap between international domestic laws regarding behavior, like copyright infringement, fraud, hate crimes,
and issues regarding network security. Most of what this convention and treaty aimed at was to act as a facilitating docum ent
for international cooperation when it comes to preventing, labeling, and punishing cyber-crimes.284

The treaty has been ratified by the EU, Australia, Canada,
Japan, and several other countries.285 In 2012, the U.N. Secretary
General Ban Ki-Moon appointed a governmental panel of experts
from fifteen states, called the “Group of Governmental Experts on
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunicatio ns
in Context of International Security,” to draft an expert report
on developments in cybersecurity and information technology.286
Id.
Id. at 5.
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282 See Joseph Espinoza & Kleopatra Moditsi, Combating Cyber Security
Threats, OLD DOMINION U. MODEL U NITED N ATIONS SOC. 1, 3–4 (2016), https: / /
www.odu.edu/content/dam/odu/offices/mun/issue-briefs-2016/ib-cyber-intelligence
-gathering.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVC8-BHXX].
283 Id. at 3.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id at 4.
278
279

330 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:295
This report, now seen as a seminal work on the cybersecurity
actions, “highlights four main areas to be addressed: cooperation,
international law, confidence-building measures, and improving
state IT capacities.”287 The most recent report from the Government Groups of Experts included four landmark findings in the
cybersecurity field:
x
x
x
x

“the existence of state sovereignty in cyberspace,
international obligations made by states are applicable in cyberspace,
states cannot use proxies to break international
law and norms, and
the recognition of the UN as the principal organization for the establishment of fundamental
principles on the topic.”288

The international platform through which nations establish a multilateral convention on cybersecurity would likely influence how the world understands the term “cybersecurity.”289
NATO is primarily a defensive organization.290 Cybersecurity from
NATO’s point of view “ha[s] security at its core,” which means
an appropriate agreement would promote a government’s ability
to safeguard its national security, at the expense of expanding
individual and business rights in the digital market.291 Those that
sponsor a defensive approach to cybersecurity believe an international cybersecurity treaty should warrant nations the power
to “know exactly who sent and received every transmission, every
transmission’s traceroute, and the contents of every transmission ;
it can delete, block, and/or seize any transmission of which it
disapproves; and it can punish efficiently those who send or rece ive
unapproved transmissions.”292
At the other end of the spectrum, the U.N. is an international organization committed to promoting social progress, better
living standards, and human rights in addition to international
287
288
289
290
291
292
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peace and security.293 A multilateral convention on cybersecurity
from the U.N.’s perspective could better incorporate the idea of
internet governance, which balances internet security with “the
type of freedoms protected by instruments such as the First,
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights,
and numerous United Nations human rights documents.”294
B. The World Trade Organization and the Free Trade of Data
Every international transaction entails a data flow across
borders.295 Whether the exchange falls between business groups
or between subsidiaries of the same company, “the business network feeds on communications between partners, often scattered
all over the world.”296 A multilateral convention should centralize
state cybersecurity actions, but not at the cost of digital trade. 297 To
protect the digital market, the WTO should recognize data as a
commodity and impose free trade obligations to allow the crossborder flow of data between international parties.298
The WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
is a positive agreement between members: “a Member agrees to
open its markets to services and service providers of other Members in only those service sectors listed in the Member’s Schedule of
Specific Commitments, and as limited by any terms and conditions
specified in that Schedule.”299 The most significant obligation
under GATS Article II requires “a Member to extend unconditionally, to services and services suppliers of any other Member,
‘treatment no less favorable’ than that it accords to like services
United Nations, What We Do, U NITED N ATIONS CAREERS (Jan. 25, 2018),
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and service suppliers of any other Member.”300 The “most favored
nation[s]” clause requires open markets for all member nations.301
However, GATS Article XIV provides a list of general exceptions to a Member’s open-market commitments,302 which “are
designed to allow Members to adopt measures, which may otherwise violate a Member’s commitments, to protect public morals,
public order, or other important societal interests.”303 The relevant
exception to the free trade of data is Article XIV(c)(ii), which
provides that GATS does not prevent a nation from limiting trade
to protect privacy of personal data.304 Thus, a member may adopt
a measure:
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provision of this Agreement including those relating to:
(ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation
to the processing and dissemination of personal data
and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts .... 305

Members invoking the GATS exception must prove that
the measure is “necessary” to the relevant public policy goals.306
Diane MacDonald and Christine Streatfeild analyze the
WTO’s GATS and the “necessary” requirement in terms of the
cross-border trade of data.307 MacDonald and Streatfeild insist
that, when discussing the necessity requirement, the WTO’s Appellate Body has referred to a
range of degrees of necessity. At one end of this continuum lies
“necessary” understood as “indispensable”; at the other end, is
“necessary” taken to mean as “making a contribution to.” We consider that a “necessary” measure is, in this continuum, located
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significantly closer to the pole of “indispensable” than to the
opposite pole of simply “making a contribution to.” 308

MacDonald and Streatfeild argue that the WTO needs to
reanalyze the issues surrounding the digital trade.309 As technology
advances, new infrastructures offer protection that may revoke
the “necessary” status of many conservative data regulations or
may not even be processing and disseminating “personal data.”310
MacDonald and Streatfeild consider the data exchanged through
financial institutions and wonder:
[b]ut, is the processing of credit card transaction data regarded
as “the processing and dissemination of personal data”? Is
“personal data” equivalent to financial data or data that simply records a credit card transaction? What if the data has been
disaggregated, such that it is stripped of markers that would
allow the identification of a particular individual? How can
disaggregated data still be regarded as “personal data” or “confidential data”?311

When considering the necessity requirement, many countries
argue that digital trade should be restricted based on the recognition of personal data privacy as a fundamental right.312 Thus,
protecting the privacy of residence is of “paramount importance”
to these countries.313 However, MacDonald and Streatfeild push
back on this notion and leave one big question the WTO has yet
to answer: “does this privacy mandate outweigh the importance
many others, such as the United States, put on the free flow of
information across the Internet?”314
The WTO has left many questions unanswered regarding
the growth of technology and the importance of the digital market.315 MacDonald and Streatfeild admit that, in practice, the
WTO dispute resolution panels usually uphold data restrictions
based on the Article XIV privacy exception.316 Yet, MacDonald
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and Streatfeild argue that, while “[a] tension exists between
businesses that rely on that information for efficient ... advertising, and business processes and consumers who are increasingly
demanding enhanced Internet privacy,” technological advancements and the explosions of cross-border data transmissions “hav e
placed the personal data issue on a collision course with international trade disciplines.”317
To promote the digital trade, the WTO must weigh privacy
interests and new technologic protections.318 While states may
be ready to seize the opportunity of digitization, arguments of
sovereignty and privacy rights impose borders in the digital
space.319 Trade agreements have helped overcome some of the
problems and inconsistencies within international trade, and the
WTO has provided a framework to bolster global conversations
as technology advances.320 To encourage business productivity,
efficiency and transparency in the digital market, the WTO n eeds
to incorporate the free trade of data into its affirmative duties.321
CONCLUSION
The digital market needs a synthesis of new ideas combined with the common international structures to create a policy initiative for new realms of human innovation.322 Data is now
everywhere—in every sector, in every economy, in every organization and user of data—the public sector included.323 The opportunity big data offers business in terms of operational efficiency,
overall firm performance, and customer service can potentially
increase profit margins up to sixty percent.324
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Legally, underdeveloped property rights and lack of regulation of trade barriers has hindered “the fourth industrial revolution.”325 Lack of property rights, combined with the digital
divide the Technologic Giants exploit to eliminate any future competitors, severely limits competition and the ability of new startups to enter the market.326 Moreover, government restrictions on
cross-border data flow negatively affect trade through increasing
business costs for digital platforms, increasing the cost of digitally intense services imports such as professional services and
cloud computing, discouraging the globalization and connection
of businesses, reducing productivity and exports, and limiting
potential productivity gains across markets.327
While the digital trade does offer vast business opportunities, one cannot ignore cybersecurity as an increasing threat.328
As the world becomes more and more digital, society is exposed
to cyberattacks on vital areas such as power grids and air traffic
controls.329 Cyberattacks are evolving quickly, and the system of
decentralized cybersecurity is struggling to catch up.330 The constant threat has widened the gap in the digital debate between
conservative security approaches like those taken in the EU and
China, to softer approaches of compliance like regulations in the
United States.331
An international convention on cybersecurity coupled with
WTO establishment of data as a commodity to which free trade
principles apply may be the standardization the global realm
needs. Standardization of cybersecurity would also present a unified front against cybercrime, offering quicker response actions,
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better accountability standards, and overall more protection for
citizens and business.332 However, policymakers should also recognize that the advances in technology can offer safer data but can
still bolster the digital market.333 Coordination between the WTO
trading policies and a multilateral cybersecurity agreement will
no doubt lead to complex and thorny discussions covering everything from infrastructure designs to state sovereignty rights.334
However, the law does not exist in a vacuum.335 Technology and
public policy related to economics, liberty and the standard of
living all implicate the development of relationships between
nations.336 As technology advances, the law must as well.337
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